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This article asks why the creation by the ASEAN+3  countries of a common 
reserve pool, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) of 2010, has 
not brought about a decisive breakthrough towards regional exchange-rate 
cooperation of Japan and China. With the global financial crisis acting as 
catalyst, optimists expected CMIM to facilitate agreement of the two East Asian 
powers on an Asian Currency Unit and Asian Monetary Fund-style institution, 
but nothing of relevance materialised. The article analyses this disappointing 
outcome by criticising the neo-functionalist optimistic view from both a realist 
and liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. It concludes that the lack of 
progress in Sino-Japanese regional currency cooperation can be explained by 
combining realist and intergovernmentalist analysis: regional rivalry of China 
and Japan, driven  by ‘high politics’ national security concerns and diverging  ‘low 
politics’ policy preferences rooted in incompatible domestic economic policy-
making regimes, is the key reason for lack of progress. 
Key words:  East Asian Regionalism, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization, 
Sino-Japanese cooperation, neo-functionalism, liberal institutionalism
1. Introduction
This paper asks why the creation by the ASEAN+3 (APT)1 countries of a 
common reserve pool to provide financial assistance to East Asian nations in case 
※ 　Associate Professor, Ritsumeikan University, College of International Relations (hassdorf@
fc.ritsumei.ac.jp)
1. For the purpose of this paper I define East Asia as the ASEAN+3 grouping (APT), that is 
the 10 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea. 
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of financial crisis, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) of 2010, 
has not brought about a decisive breakthrough towards regional exchange-rate 
cooperation. With international currency instability resulting from the global 
financial crisis (GFC) that began in 2008 acting as catalyst, it was hoped that the 
new institutional structure of CMIM would serve as a starting point for building a 
regional exchange rate regime.2 Optimists envisaged the rapid creation of an 
Asian Currency Unit (ACU), a common currency basket including yen and RMB 
at the centre of regional exchange rate stabilisation, managed by an Asian 
Monetary Fund-style institution.  However, since the CMIM was launched it has 
disappointed both as an institutional stepping stone to decouple East Asia from 
US monetary and financial hegemony and as a vehicle for further deeper regional 
financial and monetary cooperation, especially between China and Japan. Was the 
excitement about the potential of CMIM for a paradigm shift towards deeper 
regional monetary integration just a lot of fuss about nothing of importance? 
This paper analysis the causes for the disappointing outcome of CMIM for 
exchange rate cooperation between Japan and China by criticising the neo-
functionalist optimistic view, which supports hopes for currency cooperation, from 
a realist and liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. It concludes that the 
limited institutional outcomes of CMIM are primarily explained by the power 
rivalry for regional leadership between China and Japan, driven by national 
security concerns and mutual suspicions rooted in history. However, these high 
politics explanations have to be complemented by pointing out the complex low 
politics differences bedevilling Sino-Japanese intergovernmental attempts to pool 
aspects of their monetary sovereignty. These problems stem from the two 
countries’ diverging regional economic policy preferences, rooted in different 
domestic political-economic structures and interests.
This paper is organised as follows: Next it will give an overview of the state of 
APT monetary and financial cooperation before the GFC.  Section three will 
expand on the case for post-GFC Sino-Japanese exchange rate cooperation with 
the GFC acting as catalyst. Section four will review the neo-functionalist 
expectations for a spill-over from CMIM to institutionalised APT exchange-rate 
cooperation. Section five will then explain the actual deadlock of Sino-Japanese 
regional currency cooperation from a realist point-of-view. Section six will bring in 
2. The ‘crisis as catalyst’ hypothesis has been applied to East Asia, with reference to the Asian 
Financial Crisis, by MacIntyre et. al (2008).
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liberal intergovernmentalism as a necessary and complementary qualification of 
the realist explanations for the Sino-Japanese gridlock. Section seven concludes 
by pointing out that without substantive convergence of the Chinese and 
Japanese domestic political economies towards greater compatibility, regional 
institutions will remain largely ineffective in promoting deeper Sino-Japanese 
currency cooperation.
2.  Financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia before the 
global financial crisis 
Over the last decades East Asian economies have become increasingly 
integrated through trade, financial flows and direct investment. Contemporary 
intra-regional trade shares are similar to those of the EU or North America (ADB 
2008, 40). At the core of East Asia’s high trade and investment interconnectivity 
are regional production networks linking the region in with the global supply 
chains of manufacturing MNCs.  Although intraregional trade now represents 
more than half of East Asian trade, East Asia’s export-oriented economies are 
critically dependent on final demand from outside the region, mainly the US and 
the EU. Economic integration in East Asia has so far been market driven, with 
government cooperation in trade and finance gradually following behind. Free 
trade agreements are still mainly bilateral or multilateral, with the exception of 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the associated AFTA+1 agreements.3 A 
comprehensive APT free-trade framework, bringing together China and Japan, is 
still missing, although there have been deliberations of a trilateral China-South 
Korea-Japan FTA.  
The turning point towards regional financial cooperation was the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997/8 (AFC). Japan and China are at the centre of this post-
AFC financial cooperation. In response to the inadequate multilateral response to 
the crisis, Japan suggested the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), but 
the proposal foundered on US and European objections and a lack of Chinese 
support (Henning 2005, 13). However, China, after stabilising the region by 
refusing to devalue the RMB, warmed to the original Japanese idea of a regional 
liquidity mechanism to provide balance of payment support for crisis-hit East 
Asian countries. The outcome of these developments was the Chiang Mai 
3. For a good overview of the ‘noodle bowl’ of East Asian regional trade agreements, see 
Searight (2009).
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Initiative (CMI), agreed upon by APT finance ministers in May 2000. The CMI 
consists of two elements: first a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs) 
among ASEAN countries of a size of US $2bn. Secondly, and more importantly, a 
network of BSAs between individual ASEAN countries and China, Japan and 
South Korea (+3  countries), and BSAs between the +3 countries themselves, with 
a combined size of US $90bn.4 Finally, in 2003, two institutions for the 
development of a regional bond market were initiated, the Asian Bond Fund 
(ABF) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI).5 Together these initiatives 
brought a new quality of institutionalisation into the process of East Asian 
regional economic integration. 
However, as Amyx points out, despite this considerable achievement, the CMI 
network of bilateral swap agreements has always been incomplete (2008, 122). 
The most glaring weakness was the lack of a robust and independent surveillance 
and monitoring mechanism. Although the APT ministers established an Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue Mechanism (ERPD) to exchange information, 
gradually to be extended towards policy monitoring, peer review and due 
diligence, the CMI’s BSAs ultimately relied on the IMF as an enforcer, with 
release of 80 percent of the funds conditional on the negotiation of an IMF 
programme.6 This institutional weakness points at the unwillingness and/or 
inability of China and Japan, the two key financing countries of the CMI, to agree 
on a robust institutional mechanism to address the problem of credible 
governance of the system. Instead they delegated this critical aspect to the US 
dominated IMF. Therefore, CMI was neither a decisive step towards an 
independent AMF-style mechanism, nor a break with US hegemony in the 
financial and monetary relations of East Asia. 
The original CMI had little effect on monetary and exchange rate 
coordination. This can be explained by the fact that the AFC, triggering the 
initiative in the first place, was a capital account crisis, a financial emergency 
asking for balance of payments assistance. Secondly, monetary cooperation is 
more demanding in terms of constraining national economic policymaking 
autonomy than financial cooperation. Given the unwillingness of APT countries in 
4. For details on the CMI and its evolution, see Henning (2005), Kenen and Meade (2008) and 
Searight (2009). 
5. For details, see Rajan (2008b)
6. see Searight (2009, 230-233), and Amyx (2008, 124)
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general and of China and Japan in particular to compromise on their monetary 
sovereignty, regional monetary cooperation had to wait.7 However, CMI 
multilateralisation (CMIM), the creation of a common reserve pool, decided by 
APT finance ministers in May 2007 and enacted on March 24, 2010, did come 
with great expectations for a paradigm shift towards institutionalised regional 
exchange rate cooperation. 
3.  Crisis as catalyst: the case for Sino-Japanese monetary cooperation 
after the GFC
Before I come to an assessment of CMIM as a potential nucleus for Sino-
Japanese monetary cooperation, a brief review of the economic and political 
argument for APT monetary cooperation is in order. From an abstract economic 
viewpoint a lot speaks for coordination, with China and Japan as the logical 
centre. East Asian exchange rate cooperation would support trade, investment 
and financial integration in a region where many political conflicts, especially 
between Japan and China, remain unresolved. Finally it would enhance the 
influence of East Asia in multilateral organisations including the G-20, an aspect 
particularly attractive in the on-going GFC and the related redesigning of the 
global financial architecture.
Critical for why CMIM, more than the original CMI, was expected to lead into 
a qualitative leap towards regional currency cooperation is ‘systemic context’, or, 
in simple terms, the GFC as catalyst. As Henning explains, periods of systemic 
disturbances, (such as the GFC) provide a strong incentive for governments of a 
region to coordinate exchange rates to create a zone of regional monetary 
stability.8 Applied to East Asia, systemic context should give APT countries, and 
especially China and Japan, a strong incentive for regional currency management 
to cope with the crisis of the global dollar standard. Historically most East Asian 
countries have relied for a degree of exchange rate stability on the US dollar. As 
Eichengreen (2001) explains, US dollar-centred exchange rate stability was 
integral to the success of the East Asian miracle. Consequently, after the 
exchange rate turbulences of the AFC, Asian countries returned to what 
McKinnon (2005) calls ‘soft dollar pegs’ . This soft East Asian dollar standard 
constitutes a system of managed floats aimed at maintaining a degree of stability 
7. This aspect will be discussed further in section six.
8. For the systemic context approach, see Henning (1998 and 2005). 
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vis-à-vis the US dollar (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004).9 At the heart of this 
regional dollar standard is the so-called ‘Bretton Woods II’ system of relative 
exchange rate stability between East Asian currencies and the US dollar. 10 It 
revolves around sustaining growing real imbalances between East Asia and the 
US by recycling Asian current account surpluses back to the US through the 
accumulation of massive US dollar denominated reserve assets. 
However, the soft dollar pegs did not solve the volatility problem. Especially 
the volatile yen-US dollar rate remained to be the ‘loose cannon’ of East Asian 
monetary relations (McKinnon and Schnabl 2003: 8). Furthermore, the soft dollar 
pegs of East Asian economies have increased their external vulnerability: they 
find themselves trapped in what McKinnon (2005) described as the ‘conflicted 
virtue’ of accumulating ever increasing amounts of dollar reserves. The longer this 
currency strategy continues, the more difficult it becomes to allow appreciation, 
because East Asian countries risk massive reserves losses in case of US dollar 
depreciation. 
With the GFC these underlying tensions of the Bretton Woods II system have 
reached a critical juncture. Firstly, with the US internal and external deficits 
approaching unsustainable levels, further dollar weakness and even a dollar 
crisis are likely, diminishing the mercantilist benefits of the recycling mechanism. 
The attractiveness of the dollar for foreign investors seems to be crumbling in a 
situation of escalating US financing needs.11 Secondly, the crisis has revealed that 
the policy of ‘conflicted virtue’ is not only economically risky but also politically 
unsustainable. As the case of China demonstrates, if East Asian nations continue 
with stabilising their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar, they risk a currency war with 
9. Kawai (2008c: 93) describes McKinnon’s thesis of a post-AFC revived dollar standard as too 
strong, identifying  a clear trend of East Asian nations moving away from dollar-based regimes 
towards currency basket pegs including regional currencies, the yen and the euro. However, he 
acknowledges that stability vis-à-vis the dollar is still the preferred option of most East Asian 
countries. 
10. The BWS II thesis has originally been put forward by Dooley et al. (2003). On the systemic 
instability of the BWS II, see Roubini (2008). 
11. Masahiro Kawai of the Asian Development Bank Institute predicts that, ‘after the dust of 
the current financial crisis has settled’ the dollar will possibly face a crash. This prospect has let 
to ‘growing nervousness of East Asian policymakers’ (Author’s interview, 26/09/2008).  Those 
worries are confirmed by the recent downgrading of the US credit rating by Standard & Poor’s 
(see Financial Times, ‘S&P cuts US debt rating to double A plus’, August 6, 2011).  
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the US, being accused of ‘exchange rate manipulation’.12  The US-Japanese 
monetary relationship too has become more complex. Japan’s external 
competitiveness is affected by the escalating weakness of the dollar against the 
yen, forcing its administration to undertake ad-hoc interventions in an attempt to 
stabilise the yen-dollar cross.13 Finally, the crisis raised the spectre of 
undermining intraregional exchange rate stability. This is particularly relevant 
for the critical yen-RMB cross. Whereas Japan has so far abstained from 
systematic exchange rate management to mitigate the effect of systemic dollar 
instability on its currency and accepted appreciation of the yen against the US 
currency, China has defended its soft peg to the dollar. By doing so, China has 
shifted adjustment costs onto Japan, with the yen appreciating both against the 
RMB and the dollar since 2008.  Without closer regional monetary cooperation the 
risks are growing that East Asian regional monetary stability will be destroyed by 
a race of competitive devaluations (Chhibber 2008, 45-6). 
In view of these problems there has been no lack of proposals for regional 
exchange rate cooperation.14 Ideas range from coordinated pegging to the US 
dollar to single-country or multi-country basket-pegs.15 The most detailed 
proposals, related to the APT country grouping, have been put forward by the 
Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo. The case for regional moves 
to deal with dollar instability is best put by the ADBI’s Dean Masahiro Kawai:
When a sustained, sharp downward pressure on the US dollar emerges (...) resisting 
currency appreciation (...) can result in a continuous build-up of foreign exchange 
reserves, (...) the risk of price inflation, asset price bubbles and banking sector 
vulnerabilities. Faster currency appreciation (...) can contain these risks. (...) 
Collective appreciation would spread the adjustment costs across countries in the 
12. The escalating currency tensions between the US and China are demonstrated by the 
recent passing of a bill in the US Senate aiming to punish China for sustained currency 
manipulation, threatening so-called “countervailing duty” tariffs. (Financial Times, ‘US currency 
bill passes Senate vote’, October 11, 2011).
13. On the effectiveness and complex links between ad-hoc exchange rate intervention and 
domestic monetary and fiscal policy in Japan, see Financial Times, ‘Hot yen leaves Tokyo with 
cold, hard choices’, October 27, 2011.   
14. For example Chhibber (2008), Rajan (2008a), Kawai (2008c), Wong (2008).
15. For a good overview and critical discussion of these options, see Williamson (2005) and 
Kenen and Meade (2008, 160-171). A flexible peg to a basket comprising the US dollar, euro and 
yen has been proposed by for example Ogawa and Doo Yong Yang (2008), internal basket 
proposals are discussed by Kim et al. (2005). 
128 （ 128 ）
Wolf HASSDORF
region. (Kawai 2008b, 5)
The ADBI suggests a gradual path of decoupling from the US dollar, starting 
with a currency basket system as benchmark for cooperative regional exchange 
rate stabilisation (Kawai 2008c, 96-98). Although such a basket is, in the 
beginning, supposed to be dominated by the G-3 currencies (US dollar, euro, yen), 
the proposal envisages a gradual move towards coordinated stabilisation against 
an ACU, a weighted internal basket of APT currencies. Monetary cooperation 
between China and Japan is seen as essential, given the weight of their 
economies in East Asia and their massive FX holdings. 
This leaves the question of how such currency cooperation between APT 
governments, especially China and Japan, can be facilitated. As Kenen and Meade 
(2008, 156, fn.27) emphasise, the task of constructing such an ACU is fraught 
with political difficulties because of inevitable disagreements about the weights of 
individual currencies in the basket and about who should adjust in case of 
divergence of national currencies from the basket.16 
4.  Great expectations: CMIM as a ‘neo-functionalist’ gateway to 
APT exchange rate coordination?
Proponents of East Asian regional exchange-rate policy coordination, 
especially in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), thought to have found in CMIM 
a technocratic way to overcome the political-economic obstacles to cooperation, 
hoping for a neo-functionalist spill-over dynamics from CMIM to an ACU basket, 
governed by an AMF-style institution.17  To understand the neo-functionalist case 
for a spill-over from CMIM to a regional currency regime we have to review the 
qualitative changes CMIM has brought about in view of its potential for 
facilitating regional exchange rate coordination. 
Multilateralisation of the CMI, agreed by APT finance ministers in May 2007 
and implemented in March 2010, indeed represents development from the BSAs 
16. See Kim et al. (2005) on the issue of asymmetry and monetary autonomy in currency 
basket-pegs. 
17. Neo-functionalism developed as a theory explaining European integration. Key 
representatives are Haas (1958), Sandholz (for example, 1993) and Schmitter (for example, 
1969). A good overview is given by Niemann (2009).
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of the old CMI towards a self-managed reserve pooling arrangement governed by 
a single contractual agreement. The key elements of the CMIM can be 
summarized as follows:18
• 　 An overall reserve pool of $120bn is created, replacing the old BSAs of the 
CMI. The reserve pool operates under the principle of ‘self-management’. 
That means that states will maintain their reserves but pledge to make 
their share available in situations of crisis.
• 　 The purpose is balance of payments financing in crisis situations and 
supplementing existing international financial arrangements.
• 　 The ASEAN economies collectively contribute 20% of the total funds, 
while the remaining 80% are contributed by the +3 countries (Japan 32%, 
China 32%, South Korea 16%). The contribution shares determine voting 
weights, with fundamental issues decided by consensus and lending 
issues by majority. 
• 　 The CMIM creates a new APT Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) to 
monitor economic performance of economies in the region.  On top of this 
surveillance mechanism the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue 
(ERPD) will remain the key locus of state-to-state coordination and 
review.
• 　 The IMF-link of the old CMI is maintained: withdrawal from the reserve 
pool is conditional on an IMF programme for 80% of the total funds 
available. 
From a neo-functionalist point of view the implications of CMIM are as 
follows: CMIM multilateralisation, concerned about providing balance of 
payments financing to crisis-hit countries, is about exchange rate stabilisation 
and thus financial and monetary cooperation. More significant are the indirect 
consequences of CMIM. Firstly, creating a self-governed reserve pooling 
mechanism seems to lay the institutional stepping stone towards an AMF, backed 
mainly by Sino-Japanese funding. The financial institutionalisation of CMIM, 
which had been missing so far, opens an avenue towards the institutionalisation 
of monetary regionalism on similar lines: once the IMF link for lending decisions 
is removed the newly created AMRO and the strengthened ERPD mechanism will 
18. I am drawing on Grimes (2011, 94-5) and Kawai (2010, 6). The features of CMIM were 
outlined in an official joint press statement by the Monetary Authority of Singapore of 24 March 
2010. 
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be transformed to a strong AMF-style executive secretariat (Kawai 2010). This 
heralds a major institutionalisation of deepening Sino-Japanese cooperation, 
since an executive secretariat providing for rigorous economic surveillance and 
policy conditionality would need the joint backing of the two major financing 
powers.19 Secondly, a similar functional dynamics is assumed to be set in motion 
by CMIM towards the creation of an ACU as benchmark for future East Asian 
exchange rate stabilisation. As Kawai explains, the share of APT countries’ 
contributions to the reserve pool can be envisaged as a ‘technocratic’ way to 
determine the respective weight of APT currencies in a future currency basket 
constituting the ACU. ‘If shares are decided, ACU weights will be decided’.20 
Following this suggestion, the Japanese and Chinese contribution share of 32 
percent would decide the share of the yen and RMB in the ACU basket and the 
voting weight of the two countries in an AMF. 
5.  The ‘realist’ reality check of Sino-Japanese currency cooperation: 
strategic deadlock 
Triggered by the global financial crisis, CMIM was implemented in  2010 
against the expectations of observing political economist.21 However, the 
expectations for a neo-functionalist spill-over towards currency regionalism have 
so far failed to materialise. Neither has the paradigm shift towards a regional 
exchange rate regime occurred, nor have there been significant developments 
towards exchange rate coordination between China and Japan. Looking at the 
outcome of CMIM it appears that its new institutional arrangements do not 
represent a breakthrough which could serve as basis for exchange rate 
cooperation.  Most importantly, the much heralded self-governing surveillance 
and monitoring regime of the CMIM is much weaker than expected.22 It provides 
only for a layered and vague surveillance system, with AMRO in charge of 
monitoring and surveillance and the ERPD of APT ministers being the location 
for state-to-state policy communication. Critically, lending decisions will require a 
two-third majority of voting shares, making it unlikely that conditionality can be 
agreed upon if opposed by either Japan or China. Holding each 32 percent of the 
votes, each of them will have little problems to muster sufficient votes from other 
19. Author’s interview with Masahiro Kawai, 26/09/2008.
20. Author’s interview with Masahiro Kawai, 26/09/2008. See also Kawai (2010, 13-14). 
21. Sceptics included Henning (2009) and Amyx (2008).
22. The following analysis of the CMIM regime draws on Searight (2009) and Grimes (2011).
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APT member states to veto undesired policies. Given this rather toothless self-
governing arrangement, APT countries preserved the central IMF link of the old 
CMI, maintaining the rule that 80 percent of funds can only be disbursed with 
IMF approval. This makes the IMF the real power when it comes to surveillance, 
conditionality and disbursement decisions. The de facto dominance of the IMF 
standard in CMIM is confirmed by a senior Japanese financial official, justifying 
the IMF role by remarking: ‘there cannot be two different standards’ .23 In short, 
rather than constituting the nucleus for an AMF to break free from the 
US-dominated IMF, CMIM bases its governing regime on exactly the IMF link it 
was supposed to overcome. Neither Japan nor China, the main funding countries 
of CMIM, seem to be willing to give up substantial financial sovereignty to 
regional technocratic governance institutions whose decisions can easily be 
contested, preferring instead to delegate responsibility for the disbursement of 
their reserve shares to an outsider, the IMF. 
One of the strongest explanations put forward for the disappointing outcomes 
of CMIM comes from the realist perspective.24 Evelyn Goh, in a recent article, 
succinctly highlights that proliferating functionalist cooperation is not effective in 
itself in a region where the great powers are fundamentally suspicious of each 
other (Goh 2011, 396). Power rivalry between China and Japan as the key 
problem of East Asian regionalism has been analysed extensively.25 As realists 
assert, at the heart of the rivalry of the two regional powers are mutual distrust 
grounded in historical experience and the balance of power in East Asia: Japan’s 
regional policy, ultimately relying on the US-Japanese security alliance, aims to 
balance an increasingly powerful China in the region, whereas China’s goal is to 
establish regional hegemony. In this analysis Japan has to enter regional 
cooperation from a position of strength, to counter Chinese hegemonic 
ambitions.26 Consequently Sino-Japanese power rivalry has resulted in a struggle 
23. Quoted in Grimes (2011, 98).
24. A range of complementary, but less central explanations for this outcome have put forward. 
Analysts point at the entrenched dominance of the US dollar in East Asian trade and finance 
and US opposition to an effective East Asian regional exchange rate regime (Katada 2008). 
Others emphasise the original institutional deficit of the ‘ASEAN way’ of regional integration, 
often described as a talking shop (Yahuda 2005).
25. For recent examples, see Hernadez (2008), Takahara (2008), Mochizuki (2005). An excellent 
survey of the different aspects of the debate is provided by Calder and Fukuyama (2008). 
26. Togo (2008, 188). For the broader realist argument on Sino-Japanese balance of power, see 
Ikenberry (2008) and Friedberg (2011).
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for positioning in East Asian regional politics, with cooperation and peaceful 
coexistence interwoven with competition and friction (Mochizuki 2005, 140). In 
this view Sino-Japanese regional financial cooperation, a low politics issue, is in 
reality about high politics. Because both countries are jostling for regional 
influence and leadership for strategic reasons, their engagement in CMIM lacks 
substance and has been mainly symbolic. It aims primarily to signal regional 
engagement towards ASEAN countries and South Korea (Amyx 2008, 137). The 
realist view on prospects for deeper Sino-Japanese regional currency cooperation 
is put bluntly by Cohen: ‘Security still trumps finance in East Asia’, with the 
likelihood of radical reforms towards exchange rate coordination ‘close to nil’.27 
Grimes (2011) has provided a detailed realist analysis of the weaknesses of 
CMIM as a result of Sino-Japanese competition for regional leadership. He 
interprets the compromise on equal contributions and voting shares, granting 
both China and Japan near veto power, as a strategy by the two governments to 
hedge their bets when committing to the CMIM. Plagued by mutual suspicions 
and distrust, Japan and China opted for ‘nesting’ multilateralisation within the 
IMF regime, thereby making CMIM intentionally irrelevant as a stepping stone 
towards a powerful AMF. Agreeing on delegating surveillance, conditionality and 
disbursement authority to a jointly-managed self-governing executive secretariat 
would have meant to rely in a crisis situation on each other for a joint 
understanding on what represents a solvency crisis, how much funds should be 
made available and what structural adjustment measures would be required. It 
would have required for China and Japan to agree upon what constitutes sound 
policies and to trust each other that those policies would be enforced, to reduce 
the moral hazard inherent in any international-lender-of-last-resort mechanism. 
Given the fundamental power conflict between the two nations, they agreed not to 
agree and delegated the governance of CMIM to the IMF.28 
This realist assessment of the potential for Sino-Japanese currency 
cooperation constitutes an explicit criticism of the neo-functionalist excitement 
about CMIM. As Grimes put it, ‘challenges arising from competition and mistrust 
cannot be resolved through institutional means, despite the best efforts of the 
AMF advocates’ (2011, 84). Whereas the neo-functional logic suggests great 
27. Cohen (2011, 30; 2008, 44).
28. See Grimes (2011, 85-86).
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potential for CMIM to facilitate functional spill-overs towards deeper Sino-
Japanese regional cooperation, the realist analysis puts it that China and Japan 
approached CMIM essentially as a zero-sum game for regional power and 
leadership. The strength of this view lies in its focus on the reality of 
international politics, with Japan’s and China’s national interests and relative 
power ultimate determining whether regional cooperation can succeed or not. 
Empirical evidence, such as the weakness of the CMIM agreement and the 
standstill in Sino-Japanese monetary cooperation, lends substantial support to 
the realist critique of the neo-functionalist vision. However, the realist analysis of 
CMIM has to be complemented and qualified by bringing in the liberal 
intergovernmentalist dimension of currency rivalry between China and Japan. 
This dimension has so far been given scant systematic attention in the literature 
on CMIM.
6.  Sino-Japanese intergovernmental bargaining: ‘rescuing’ national 
autonomy in regional interdependence29 
Similar to realism, liberal intergovernmentalism puts national interest and 
state actors at the heart of the analysis of regional cooperation.30 However, in 
contrast to neo-realism, which prioritises ‘systemic’ security and balance-of-power 
factors to explain national interests, intergovernmentalism starts from liberal 
institutionalism. In this prism the foreign policy goals of governments in 
international economic cooperation conflict because they are shaped by divergent 
domestic institutional and interest constellations (Moravcsik 1993, 481). National 
preferences in regional intergovernmental bargaining are not reflecting a 
monolithic and immutable concern with national security, but vary according to 
issue-specific domestic interests and structural factors. In this view national 
governments share an interest in achieving mutual gains through regional 
economic cooperation. However, since their preferences for the shape, scope and 
institutional design of regional cooperative arrangements differ, given different 
domestic interest and institutional constellations, the distribution of relative 
gains from cooperation matters. As a result, bargaining for regional economic 
29. The idea that regional cooperation is about ‘rescuing’ state capacity in the age of 
globalisation is adopted from Milward (2000). 
30. Like neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism has been developed as an explanation of 
European integration. Its main representative is Andrew Moravcsik (see, for example, 1998). For a 
good overview of liberal intergovernmentalist theory, see Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009).
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cooperative arrangements is hard-nosed and does not always result in successful 
outcomes (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009). Regional agreements will be 
difficult to achieve if critical aspects of national economic policy autonomy are at 
stake. Relative power of governments in intergovernmental bargaining depends 
on ‘asymmetric interdependence’. The more a state is dependent on achieving 
regional integration in an issue area, the more willing will its government be to 
compromise (Moravcsik 1998, 3). Finally, the institutional outcomes of 
intergovernmental bargaining will reflect the desire by governments to tie others 
into legal frameworks which can be reinforced to reduce uncertainty about 
whether agreement will be implemented and properly administered by the other 
side (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig 2009, 73). 
From the intergovernmental perspective the conflict of China and Japan in 
CMIM cooperation and their inability to arrive at substantive outcomes for currency 
cooperation appears more grounded in actual differences in domestic structures, 
rather than simply being the result of a regional security dilemma.  Their rivalry is 
about reducing the constraints imposed by cooperation on their respective national 
economic policy autonomy. The Financial Times, commenting on CMIM, describes 
this problematic dimension of East Asian currency cooperation well: 
In practice, the lesson of the past decade is probably that the complex dealmaking and 
concessions on sovereignty required by sophisticated multilateral currency 
arrangements are beyond Asia’s capacity at this stage of its development.31
The structural differences of the two national economic systems, resulting in 
different foreign economic policy preferences, are substantial.  Japanese and 
Chinese domestic monetary and financial policies are embedded in different 
interest and institutional settings. The governance of Chinese monetary and 
financial policies is unreliable. The economy is managed by an authoritarian 
regime, unaccountable to proper rule of law or democratic checks and balances. 
Within this state-capitalist system the party-state controls the central bank and 
maintains a system of domestic financial repression by relying on state-owned 
banks, capital controls and a managed exchange rate.32 Japan, in contrast, 
31. Financial Times, ‘Currency co-operation creeps on to Asian agenda’, January 11, 2011. The 
FT remains carefully optimistic on the longer-term prospects for limited progress in currency 
cooperation.
32. See Shih (2008) and Huang (2008).
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displays the sound institutional checks and balances of a mature market economy 
and parliamentary democracy. It features an independent judiciary, an 
independent central bank, and a private banking system which is integrated into 
the structure of global financial markets. Furthermore, it combines an open 
capital account with a fully convertible international key currency.33 
China and Japan are confronting domestic economic management challenges of 
a different kind, reflecting differences in the way their economies operate and 
interact with the open world economy. Japan’s coordinated market economy is stuck 
in the long-run malaise of a liquidity trap, resulting in deflationary low growth, a 
condition which is putting huge demands on domestic monetary and fiscal 
management.34 In addition, as Katada (2008) explains, Japan’s current global 
integration into the dollar-centred international exchange rate regime is structurally 
embedded in its financial and business practices, with little domestic support of policy 
initiatives to break loose from the US dollar in favour of regionalisation. China, in 
contrast, is caught-up in an entrenched mercantilist developmental growth model, 
which is supported by, and at the same time supporting, the Chinese party-state. As a 
result its policy-makers struggle with a highly distorted dual economy with 
dynamically growing internal and external economic imbalances.35 Given these 
different national economic and monetary policy challenges, Japan and China are 
both reluctant to constrain their domestic economic and monetary policy autonomy 
by cooperating. They are unwilling to enter into serious regional exchange rate 
commitments since this risks that the other big power might be able to impose its 
policy preferences, constraining the own monetary policymaking room-for-
manoeuvre.36 This means that Japanese or Chinese policymakers will only commit to 
a regional monetary cooperation regime if it is either institutionally weak and 
ineffective, or dominated by their own currency, so that they can enforce their 
preferences across the region and against the other power. 
At the centre of Sino-Japanese currency competition is the problem of 
national autonomy, key currencies and asymmetry. 37 The problems of the 
33. See Henning (1994).
34. See Ito et al. (2005). On the liquidity trap, see Krugman (1998).
35. See Pei (2006)
36. The trade-off between domestic autonomy and fixed exchange rates is formalised in the 
Mundell-Fleming Model. For an excellent discussion of the political economy of this trade-off and 
the domestic politics of exchange rate management, see Frieden (2010).
37. On ‘oligoplilistic currency competition’, see Cohen (1998, 131-149).
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asymmetrical nature of international monetary relations and the privileges the 
key currency country enjoys in a pegged exchange rate system have long been 
recognised by international monetary economists.38 Building on the Mundell-
Fleming Model, they show that regional exchange rate stabilisation, if it is 
asymmetrically dominated by a major currency such as the yen or the RMB, 
results in the key currency country being able to preserve a high degree of 
monetary policymaking autonomy.39 Equal shares or symmetry of major countries 
who cannot agree on substance offers no way out of this problem, since it makes 
efficient and coherent management of the regional monetary regime unlikely, 
with the major players being able to block each other’s policy initiatives.40
Against this backdrop Sino-Japanese currency competition can be summed up as 
a struggle for securing the highest degree possible of domestic policy autonomy in any 
move towards a regional exchange rate arrangement. Regional currency rivalry 
between the two powers is then about promoting the own currency as anchor 
currency and preventing the rival currency from establishing a dominant role.41 
Furthermore, neither China nor Japan can afford to agree to a powerful self-
governing AMF which technically resolves the problem of currency rivalry by given 
them both equal say. Both for China and Japan the other’s national currency regime 
is inacceptable as basis for managing an AMF/ACU regime. For Japan, the Chinese, 
caught in the dilemma of keeping an inconvertible RMB undervalued and rising 
domestic inflationary pressures, cannot currently offer a currency regime which 
could serve as anchor for regional cooperation.42 China, on the other side, is 
38. For example, De Grauwe (1997).
39. For a good elaboration for East Asian monetary cooperation, see Kim et al. (2005). 
40. Monetary political economists point out that currency hierarchy in regional monetary 
arrangements is a necessary structural condition for stable exchange rate arrangements to be 
credible in financial markets (Cohen 1998, Andrews 1994).  
41. This is succinctly put, from a Chinese perspective, by two Chinese academics, who state: 
‘China should take effective actions to reinforce the cooperation with Japan in this field, and to 
ensure China the axis power and RMB the anchor currency in East Asian currencies 
cooperation.’ Zhang, H., and Liu, L. (2009) ‘Game Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Relationship in 
East Asian Currency Cooperation’, Contemporary Economy of Japan, 2, abstract (grammatical 
mistakes in the original). http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-XDRJ200902003.htm 
42. Amyx (2008, 125) suggests that not only Japan, but policymakers across the East Asian 
region are concerned about the reliability of China’s commitments within the CMI framework in 
light of the distorted political economy of Chinese currency management. On the political 
economy of the RMB, see Kroeber, A. ‘The Renminbi: the Political Economy of a Currency’ , 
Foreign Policy, September 7, 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/07/the_
renminbi_the_political_economy_of_a_currency?page=0,0  
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unwilling to accept an asymmetrically strong position of Japan in an AMF and 
ACU-basket, concerned that this might be used by Japan to exert influence on 
China to liberalise its capital account, move towards full convertibility and reform 
its current exchange rate management arrangements (Amyx 2008, 137-8).
The different policy preferences naturally led to hard-nosed and long-dragged 
out intergovernmental bargaining about the shares of the yen and the RMB in the 
CMIM reserve pool and a possible future ACU basket.43 Katada explains that 
Japan tried to consolidate the existing asymmetric advantage of the yen, 
attempting ‘to lock in the existing disparity by formalizing arrangements such as 
the wider use of yen in the region.’ China in contrast was unwilling to accept a 
subordinated position of the RMB.44 Amyx confirms this assessment, explaining 
that Chinese suspicions about the ACU initiative by the ADB, dominated by 
former Japanese Ministry of Finance officials, delayed negotiations: China’s 
concern was that the Japanese government might be using the composition and 
weighting of the basket to promote the yen (Amyx 2008, 134, esp. fn 18). 
Finally, the institutional outcome of CMIM reflects the widely diverging 
national preferences of China and Japan as well as the respective strength of 
their bargaining positions. Firstly the two countries settled on equal shares in the 
reserve pool, although Japan had aimed at locking in disparity in favour of the 
yen. This indicates ‘asymmetric interdependence’ for Japan:  facing a declining 
role of the yen in East Asian monetary relations, the Japanese administration 
was finally willing to compromise by accepting equal weights. China on the other 
side was in no hurry to enter into an early arrangement with Japan, given the 
ever-increasing importance of the RMB in East Asian economic transactions. 
Furthermore, by delegating governance to the IMF, Japan was reassured of sound 
management of the reserve pool despite its suspicions about the Chinese 
commitment to sound regional monetary policies. China, on the other hand, got 
with the weak CMIM governing structure and the IMF link a regime which is of 
little relevance as a blueprint for a self-governing AMF, allaying its concerns that 
it might get locked into a condominium with Japan in regional currency affairs 
which would preclude future Chinese currency hegemony in East Asia.
43. CMIM implementation, originally scheduled for May 2009, was delayed until March 2010 
by difficulties to find a consensus on the relative shares of the +3 countries in the reserve pool. 
44. (Katada 2008, 410). 
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7. Conclusion
Both the realist and the intergovernmentalist analysis of CMIM support the 
view that CMIM is ‘Much Ado about Nothing’ when it comes to Sino-Japanese 
regional currency cooperation in the foreseeable future. In the words of Kahler, 
the GFC ‘has done little to jolt the [East Asian] region out of its institutional rut’ 
(2011, 23). In the light of the outcomes of CMIM and the subsequent lack of 
substantive developments, the functionalist hopes for a spill-over from CMIM to 
an AMF and ACU-basket remain, for the time being, unfulfilled. Rather than 
leading into Sino-Japanese currency cooperation, CMIM was followed by steps of 
both Japan and China to reinforce and expand the regional position of their 
national currencies. Japan has substantially increased its bilateral swap 
agreements with South Korea, tying in the strategically important third player in 
regional currency cooperation.45 China, for its part, is busily pushing for the 
gradual internationalisation of the RMB by focusing firstly on expanding its 
regional role.46 In short, Sino-Japanese currency competition, post-CMIM, is alive 
and kicking, confirming realist and intergovernmentalist interpretations.
However, the intergovernmentalist analysis arrives at the same conclusions 
as realism from a rather different perspective, emphasising the domestically 
driven low politics of exchange rate cooperation. This does not mean that the 
realist and the intergovernmentalist explanations are mutually exclusive. On the 
contrary, they are complementary, each emphasising different aspects of the 
political-economic reality of Sino-Japanese rivalry. Like realism, the 
intergovernmentalist explanation of this rivalry poses a serious challenge to the 
technocratic logic of neo-functionalism. But the challenge comes from a different 
angle, approaching Sino-Japanese currency competition not as an exogenous 
security problem, but as endogenous to the political economy of currency 
regionalism, rooted in the conflict between regional cooperation and the desire to 
maintain domestic monetary policymaking autonomy. Given the fundamental 
differences in their national systems of capitalism, a meaningful trade-off 
between domestic autonomy and international cooperation, accommodating both 
Japan’s and China’s core national economic preferences, could not be 
accomplished.
45. See Financial Times, ‘S Korea and Japan boost currency swap deal’, October 19, 2011.
46. For a good review of the Chinese strategy to turn the RMB into a global currency, see the 
HSBC research report ‘The Rise of the Redback’ (Qu et al., 2010). 
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The differences between the realist and the intergovernmentalist perspective 
matter when it comes to the question of whether China and Japan will in future be 
able to cooperate. The realist viewpoint sees little objections to Sino-Japanese 
currency cooperation if their high politics security concerns were resolved. Since the 
Sino-Chinese security dilemma is essentially exogenous to exchange rate cooperation, 
it should become possible if China and Japan learn to trust each other. However, as 
sophisticated realists are aware, a mutually acceptable resolution of Sino-Japanese 
security tensions might require a decisive breakthrough in domestic political 
liberalisation in China.47 The sophisticated realist argument is here converging 
towards the liberal intergovernmental position that domestic factors have to be taken 
into consideration to understand intergovernmental differences. 
However, the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective does not see defusing 
regional security rivalry as the magic bullet to get serious Sino-Japanese 
exchange rate cooperation going. Only once domestic political-economic interests 
and institutions have sufficiently converged, resulting in converging national 
economic policy preferences, will meaningful political compromises for effective 
regional exchange rate cooperation become possible. In view of the vast cleavage 
between the Chinese and Japanese domestic political-economic structures the 
intergovernmentalist perspective does not give more cause for optimism than its 
realist counterpart. In the final analysis convergence in regional monetary policy 
preferences might require significant progress in China’s economic and, arguably, 
political liberalisation for Chinese exchange rate policies and monetary 
governance to become more compatible with their Japanese counterpart.48  It is 
unlikely that the Chinese government will undertake those changes to allow 
CMIM to spill over into regional monetary cooperation as hoped for by neo-
functionalists, since these are domestic reforms that might go to the core of what 
the current Chinese regime considers their national interests.49 
47. See, for example, Friedberg (2011, 49-52)
48. In the realist logic another solution of the problem of Sino-Japanese cooperation would be 
for China to become economically and politically so powerful that it can enforce its hegemonic 
version of regional exchange rate cooperation against Japanese preferences. Grimes (2011, 104) 
hints at such a possibility. 
49. Global Times, a Chinese government controlled newspaper, reports that in a recent White 
Paper by the Chinese government, released in September 2011, ‘China’s political system and 
ensuring sustainable economic and social development have been officially declared as being 
among China’s core interests’ (Global Times, quoted in Financial Times, ‘China’s spreading core 
interests’, September 13, 2011).
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